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Note: Supplemental Jury Charges Urging A Verdict-
The Answer is Yet to be Found
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM
In recent years there has been growing debate over
the extent to which a trial judge in a criminal trial should be
permitted to encourage jurors to avoid deadlock and agree on
a verdict. The danger is that the judge may use his authority
to coerce the jury and interfere with their factfinding function.1
This problem is particularly acute when prolonged deliberation
has resulted in seeming deadlock and the judge chooses to give
a supplemental charge urging agreement.
Although it is clear that outside influences should play no
part in a jury's deliberation,2 it is equally clear that in federal
criminal courts trial judges have the power to urge the jury
to agree.3 Where a supplemental charge is issued the danger
of judicial coercion4 is especially acute, because the very pur-
l. A criminal jury may be improperly instructed and thus coerced
in many ways. For example, it is improper for a court to order a guilty
verdict, Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135 (1920); Wissel v.
United States, 22 F.2d 468 (1927); or for a court to order a deadlockedjury to return a verdict, Jenkins v. U.S., 380 U.S. 445 (1965). The jury
must be allowed to express an "independent judgment in the prem-
ises." Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894). The influence of
the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight
and his lightest word or intimation is received with deference and
may prove controlling. Id.
2. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966); Turner v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965); Allison v. United States, 160 U.S. 203,
217 (1895).
3. '"The Court may admonish the jury as to the importance of
agreeing on a verdict, and may urge them to make every effort to
agree, but it must not give instructions which will have a tendency to
coerce the jury." 23A C.J.S. Trial, § 1187 at 468. See United States v.
Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Betancourt,
427 F.2d 851 (5th Cir.1970); Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394
(D.C. Cir. 1950); Claiborne v. United States, 77 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1935);
Shaffman v. United States, 289 F. 370 (3d Cir. 1923); Note, On In-
structing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J. 100, 101 (1968); Comment,
Criminal Law-Instructions By Trial Court Urging Agreement Among
Jurors, 34 TuLAwE L. REV. 214 & n.5 (1956).
4. A jury is coerced by a supplemental instruction urging agree-
ment when that instruction causes a verdict which is against the con-
scientiously held beliefs of any juror. In that event the jury has not
properly performed its function. In reaching a verdict it is widely
accepted that the jury's major function is to reflect the sentiments of
the community. In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the
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pose of the supplemental charge is to produce agreement when
none appears in sight.5 Defendants convicted after such a
charge often argue that it was coercive, either because of its
wording or the timing of issuance. The issue before a review-
ing court usually is framed in terms of whether the judge was
simply advising or persuading the jury and thus acting prop-
erly,6 or whether he was commanding or unduly influencing
them, in which event the charge was coercive and thus im-
proper.7 However, in most cases involving supplementary in-
structions urging agreement, the line between the permissible
and the impermissible is extremely fine.
This note analyzes the use in federal criminal courts of
two supplemental instructions urging agreement: the Allen
charge, which is the traditional federal charge, and a recom-
mended charge published by the American Bar Association
(hereinafter the ABA). The note also investigates the need for
any supplemental instructions urging agreement and the role
of the court in dealing with seemingly deadlocked juries.
Supreme Court spoke approvingly of this function (id., at 201) and
quoted from Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), that juries in
capital cases "do little more-and must do nothing less-than express
the conscience of the community. . . ." Id. at 519. The jury must
maintain a link between contemporary community values and
the penal system-a link without which the determination of
punishment could hardly reflect "the evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Id. at n.15. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 129-30 (1948); Broeder,
MEMORANDUM REGARDING JURY SYSTEMS in Hearings on the Recording
of Jury Deliberations Before the Subcommittee on Internal Security of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1955); Holmes,
Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HAMv. L. REv. 443, 460 (1899);
Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12, 18-19 (1910);
Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74
YALE L.J. 170 (1964). See also Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d
150 (1955). This delicate function cannot be performed if the court is
directly or impliedly ordering the jury to break their deadlock and re-
turn a verdict. A coerced jury may reflect the sentiment of the ma-
jority of the jury but the requirement of a unanimous verdict demands
that the sentiment reflected in the verdict be that of every juror. A
properly functioning jury either reaches a unanimous verdict based on
community sentiment or none at all.
5. United States v. Bowles, 428 F.2d 592, 595 (2d Cir. 1970).
6. See, e.g., Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431 (10th Cir.
1966); Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1965), rev'd on
other grounds, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d
127 (5th Cir. 1960); State v. Oswald, 197 Kan. 251, 417 P.2d 261 (1966);
State v. Parker, 79 Wash. 2d 326, 485 P.2d 60 (1971).
7. E.g., Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965); Green v.
United States, 309 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1962); Wissel v. United States,





Although various supplemental instructions urging agree-
ment have been suggested and tried8 by trial courts, the Allen
charge and the ABA charge are presently the two most fre-
quently used charges. The Allen charge is generally regarded
as the more potentially coercive9 although both charges are in-
tended to convey the same idea: a deadlocked jury should re-
turn to the juryroom and attempt again to reach a verdict.
A. THE Allen CHARGE: THE TRADITIONAL SOLUTION
The supplemental charge urging agreement which histor-
ically has been used in federal courts is the Allen charge. The
charge was first allowed by the Supreme Court in 1896 in a
murder case 10 from which the charge takes its name. The Court
approved the instruction which, in substance, stated:
that in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could
not be expected; that although the verdict must be the ver-
dict of each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence
in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the
question submitted with candor and with a proper regard
and deference to the opinions of each other; that it was their
duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do so;
that they should listen with a disposition to be convinced, to
each other's arguments; that if much the larger number were
for conviction a dissenting juror should consider whether his
8. E.g., W. MAzrs & E. DEvrrT, FtmuLri JuRy PRAc77cn Aim IN-
STEUCTrONSD im A Cmm AL § 15.16 (1965). 5 BRNsoNs INSTRuc-
ioNs To JuRiEs § 3455 (3d ed., A. Reid 1962 RepI) cites twelve varia-
tions used in various jurisdictions.
State courts are not uniform in adopting one supplemental charge
to urge agreement. Nineteen states, including Mfinnesota, allow supple-
mental charges which generally follow the Allen charge. See cases
cited in Annot, 100 A.L.R.2d 177, 183-84 (1965). Other states do not
allow the Allen charge or variations thereof. E.g., State v. Thomas,
86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197 (1959); State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353
P.2d 1054 (1960). Recently states have been adopting the ABA charge.
E.g., Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831 (Alaska, 1971); Commonwealth v.
Spencer, 442 Pa. 331, 275 A.2d 299 (1971); State v. Ferguson, 84 S.D. 605,
175 N.W.2d 57 (1970).
9. It is implicit in the decisions of the Supreme Court deal-
ing with the Allen case, e.g., Burton v. United States, 196 U.S.
283, and Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 (1926), that the
Fourth Circuit was correct in its recent holding [in United States
v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 435-37 (4th Cir. 1961)] "that the Allen
charge itself approaches the ultimate permissible limits. . ." in
handling situations similar to that facing the court below.
Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 1962). See Fulwood
v. United States, 369 F.2d 960, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J.). But see
Note, supra note 3, at 105 & n.25.
10. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
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doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression upon
the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent
with himself. If, upon the other hand the majority was for
acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they
might reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which
was not concurred in by the majority."
The Court reasoned that although a jury's decision must be
based on the individual opinions of each juror, "it by no means
follows that opinions may not be changed by conference in the
juryroom. The very object of the jury system is to secure un-
animity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among
the jurors themselves.' 1 2
Despite this offered justification, the Allen charge, from its
inception, 1 3 has been the subject of severe criticism.1 4  The
many states15 and the majority of federal courts10 which have
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Territory v. King, 6 Dak. 131, 50 N.W. 623 (1889); Holland v.
People, 30 Colo. 94, 69 P. 519 (1902); State v. Garrett, 57 Kan. 132, 45
P. 93 (1896); State v. Howell, 26 Mont. 3, 66 P. 291 (1901). In some
cases the criticism is directed toward Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62
Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851), which the S'upreme Court specifically adopted
in Allen.
14. The Allen charge has persisted "not so much as an object of
commendation as . . .a product of toleration." United States v. Fiora-
vanti, 412 F.2d 407, 415 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Panaccione v.
United States, 396 U.S. 827 (1969). See United States v. Thomas,
449 F.2d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335
(4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Winn, 415 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1017 (1970); Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 739 (5th
Cir. 1965) (Coleman, J. concurring); Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d
530 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th
Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., dissenting); Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d
127, 129 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom, J., dissenting); Green v. United States,
309 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir. 1962). The commentators appear to be unani-
mously opposed to the Allen charge. Comment, Deadlocked Juries and
Dynamite: A Critical Look At The "Allen" Charge, 31 U. CHI. L. REV.
386, 387 (1964); Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy And The Hung
Jury: A Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REV. 123 (1967);
Note, supra note 3; Comment, Defusing the Dynamite Charge: A
Critique of Allen and Its Progeny, 36 TENN. L. REV. 749 (1969); Com-
ment, 4 HousTON L. REV. 292 (1966). Some of the critics are quite
caustic: "Despite the durability of the Allen charge under heavy attack,
its utlimate demise seems clearly indicated. In law, as in other mat-
ters error cannot permanently endure. The Allen charge is error."
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 502, at 360
(1969). "Nor do we circulate the Allen charge to the new judges as I
used to do when heading up the criminal division of the Depart-
ment of Justice. Allen is dead and we do not believe in dead law."
Mr. Justice Clark speaking in Progress of Project Effective Justice-A
Report on the Joint Committee, 47 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 88, 90 (1963).
15. Cases cited in note 8 supra.
16. United States v. Williams, 444 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1971); Munroe
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adopted the charge often have done so over strong dissents.17
The recent trend in both state and federal courts appears to
be toward rejection of the charge.' 8 In addition, although the
Supreme Court has reaffirmed its approval of the charge, 0 it
has never done so enthusiastically.20  Allen is the only case in
which the Court directly discussed the precise issue, and the
Court has not granted certiorari on an Allen charge case since
1951, even though it has had many opportunities to do so.21
As with all supplemental charges urging agreement, the
goal of the Allen charge is to prod the jury into fruitful deliber-
v. United States, 424 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Sawyers,
423 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1970); Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543
(8th Cir. 1969); Sanders v. United States, 415 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Harris, 391 F.2d 348 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1963); Boston & MR.R. v. Stewart,
254 F. 14 (1st Cir. 1918).
17. E.g., Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 739-41 (5th Cir.
1965) (Coleman, J., concurring specially); Walker v. United States,
342 F.2d 22, 28 (5th Cir. 1965) (Brown, J., dissenting); Andrews v.
United States, 309 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom, J. dissenting);
Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown,
J., dissenting); State v. Voeckell, 69 Ariz. 145, 155, 210 P.2d 972, 979
(1949) (Udall, J., dissenting); State v. Parker, 79 Wash. 2d 326, 485
P.2d 60, 65-66 (1971) (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
18. See text accompanying notes 37-52 infra. Recently some states
which had previously adopted the charge have abandoned it. E.g.,
Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831 (Alaska, 1971); State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz.
161, 342 P.2d 197 (1959); State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d
1054 (1960); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 331, 275 A.2d 299
(1971).
19. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1951), affg 190 F.2d
506 (9th Cir. 1951); Lias et al. v. United States, 284 U.S. 584 (1931),
affjg 51 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1931).
20. The Court has only dealt with the general area once since 1941
and at that time carefully avoided the exact Allen charge issue. Jenkins
v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965). Even in 1951 the Court did not
discuss the Allen issue but simply stated that the issue was covered well
by the circuit opinion. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 744
(1951), affg 190 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1951). The Court has not even cited
the Allen case in dealing with supplemental charges since Lias et al.
v. United States, 284 U.S. 584 (1931).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 432 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Sanders v. United States, 415 F.2d 621
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 976 (1970); Thaggard v. United
States, 354 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966);
Wacker v. United States, 342 F.2d 22 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
859 (1965); Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 946 (1963). Even in cases where circuits have
thrown out the Allen charge the Supreme Court has denied certiorari.
United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1017 (1970); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Panaccione v. United States, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
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ation leading to a verdict.22  Over the years, however, the
charge has become known as the "dynamite charge '28 or, less
frequently, the "nitroglycerine charge, '24 the "third degree in-
struction, ' '2 5 or the "shotgun instruction, ' 20 suggesting that at
least in the view of some judges, the prodding is not always
gentle. The primary criticism centers around the fact that the
Allen charge tells only the minority to re-examine their position
and not the majority, 27 and that the charge easily can be under-
stood as a demand by the court that the jury reach a verdict.28
B. THE ABA CHARGE: A RECENT ALTERNATIVE
In 1968, the ABA, through its Project on Minimum Stand-
ards for Criminal Justice, published a modification of the Allen
charge.29  The Commentary accompanying the text indicates
that the new charge is designed to be less coercive because it
tells all jurors to "consult with one another" in reaching a ver-
22. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
23. Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 853 (5th Cir. 1962).
24. Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1962)
(Brown, J., dissenting).
25. Leech v. People, 112 Colo. 120, 123, 146 P.2d 346, 347 (1944).
26. State v. Nelson, 63 N.M. 428, 431, 321 P.2d 202, 204 (1958).
27. Burrup v. United States, 371 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1967)
(Phillips, J., concurring); Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431 (10th
Cir. 1966). "[T]he very real treachery of the Allen Charge [is that it]
contains no admonition that the majority reexamine its position; it cau-
tions only the minority to see the error of its ways." United States
v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417 (3d Cir. 1969). In State v. Parker the
court explained this criticism:
[A] juror who is admonished that he must vote according to
his own conscience and at the same time is told that if he dis-
agrees with the majority he must doubt his own wisdom, is
thrust upon the horns of a dilemma. In escaping that dilemma,
he cannot ignore the fact that the judge has indicated that he
considers the majority to be right. Furthermore, the juror's
attention, rather than being directed to the objective determina-
tion of the guilt or innocence of the accused, is turned upon
himself in an agonizing appraisal of his own motives. It
should not be surprising if a juror concludes that the law pre-
fers that he be agreeable rather than that he be intellectually
honest.
79 Wash. 2d 326, 485 P.2d 60, 65 (1970) (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
See also Note, supra note 14, at 128-30.
28. E.g., Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 739 (5th Cir.
1965) (Coleman, J., concurring specially). Most courts do not find that
Allen itself demands a verdict although variations of it may do so.
United States v. Bowles, 428 F.2d 592, 595-97 (2d Cir. 1970).
29. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING To TRIAL BY JURY 145-165
(Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter referred to as ABA PROJECT].
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dict rather than singling out the minority alone.30 The Com-
mentary explicitly demands that the Allen charge no longer
be used.3 '
The suggested ABA instruction is in the form of directions
to the trial court, which that court may paraphrase in delivery
to the jury:32
5.4 Length of deliberations; deadlocked jury.
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may
give an instruction which informs the jury:
i) that in order to reach a verdict, each juror must agree
thereto;
(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and
to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement if it can
be done without violence to individual judgement;
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but
only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his
fellow jurors;
(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not
hesitate to reexamine his own views and change his opinion
if convinced it is erroneous; and
(v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as
to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the
opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of re-
turning a verdict.
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable
to agree, the court may require the jury to continue their
deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction as pro-
vided in subsection (a). The court shall not require or threaten
to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length
of time or unreasonable intervals.
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon
a verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability
of agreement.33
The charge generally has been well received.3 ' It repre-
sents a welcome alternative for those circuits which had re-
luctantly allowed the Allen charge, but had devoted much judi-
cial time and energy to scrutinizing cases in which the charge
was given, and had frequently reversed or threatened to re-
verse on variations of the charge. Rather than simply holding
that the charge in the case before them was improper, or demand-
ing that trial courts follow Allen closely, appellate courts are
30. Id. at 147. See Kelley v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 641, 645, 187 N.W.2d
810, 812 (1971).
31. ABA PRojECT, supra note 29, at 146, 156.
32. Id. at 146-47, where an example of an acceptable paraphrase is
given. See Mathes, Jury Instructions and Forms For Federal Criminal
Cases, 27 F.R.D. 39, 97-98 (1961) (Instruction 8.11).
33. ABA PROJECT, supra note 29, at 145-46.
34. See note 18 supra, and text accompanying notes 37-52 infra.
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now able to suggest a reasonably flexible affirmative standard
for a trial court confronted with a deadlocked jury.
Three circuits expressly have adopted the ABA standards
and at least two others recommend them.35  Only one circuit
has specifically stated a continued preference for the Allen
charge.36 In 1969, two circuits discarded the Allen charge and
replaced it with the ABA charge. First, the Seventh Circuit,
while refusing to declare the Allen charge unconstitutional,
decided that its potential for coercion was so great that it should
no longer be used.37 Next, the Third Circuit intensely criticized
the Allen charge's demand that only the minority reexamine its
thinking.3 8  The court held this one-sided order to be an un-
warranted judicial invasion into the exclusive province of the
jury39 based on the false premise that the majority is more likely
to be right than the minority.40 The court felt that the Allen
charge jeopardizes the principles underlying the requirement of
a unanimous jury verdict.41 However, neither opinion explicitly
described why the ABA charge represents an improvement over
the Allen charge.
Most recently, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Thomas42 ruled that trial judges
within the circuit must use the ABA charge if they wish to
give supplemental instructions urging agreement. The court re-
fused to say that the Allen charge was coercive per se,43 but
felt that there was actual coercion in view of the facts before it.
In any case, the court felt that the difficulties of judicial ad-
ministration 44 which the Allen charge had created required that
35. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits recommend the ABA charge
but have not disavowed the Allen charge. United States v. Sawyers,
423 F.2d 1335, 1343 & n.7 (4th Cir. 1970); Munroe v. United States,
424 F.2d 243, 246 (10th Cir. 1970).
36. United States v. Hynes, 424 F.2d 754, 757 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 933 (1970), where the court noted that other cir-
cuits had adopted the ABA charge but reiterated its support for the
Allen charge. See also United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335 (4th
Cir. 1970).
37. United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1017 (1969).
38. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied sub nom. Panaccione v. United States, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
39. Id. at 417.
40. Id. at 416.
41. Id. at 417-19.
42. 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971).




as an exercise of its supervisory power the court instruct lower
courts to use the ABA charge. The court emphasized the great
amount of judicial time spent scrutinizing cases in which an
Allen type charge was issued,45 and felt that it had to establish
a basic presumption that a certain charge was proper. For the
first time a court adopting the ABA charge not only reversed
on the basis of the Allen charge,4" but also discussed why the
new charge was an improvement. The court adopted the rea-
soning used in a previous case,47 stating that the new charge
is relatively free of potentially coercive influences, does not
tend to place proponents of a minority view in a vulnerable
position, and does not perpetuate the unfortunate view that
in case of a mistrial, another jury will inevitably be assembled
to decide the case.4"
Thomas was decided en banc with a four man dissent. The
dissent, leaning heavily on a 1966 opinion49 written by then
Judge Burger, stated that the ABA charge is simply an invita-
tion to a stubborn juror to persist in blind adherence to his
position. 50 Instead of ending deadlocks it will only solidify
them. The dissent also stated that until the Supreme Court
overrules itself it is not for the circuit courts to do so.51
Other circuits continue to allow the Allen charge,52 but no
circuit has specifically disallowed the ABA charge. The cases
which have considered the issue seem to view the ABA charge
as simply a diluted Allen charge. However, the crucial issue is
whether it is a significant improvement.
45. Id. at 1184.
46. The Court makes it clear that the evidence in the case was
very close, thus implying that the Allen charge may well have been the
difference between a hung jury and the guilty verdict. Id. at 1179-80,
83.
47. United States v. Johnson, 432 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 949 (1970). In this case the court recommended the ABA
charge but stated that it would postpone the issue of the acceptability
of the Allen charge until the court was convened en banc. Id. at 639.
48. Id. at 631-32. The third criticism does not apply to the Allen
charge itself. It is directed to the many variations of the charge
which imply, or state, that another jury must be convened if the sitting
one deadlocks. Cf. Fulwood v. United States, 369 F.2d 960, 963 (D.C.
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 934 (1967).
49. Fulwood v. United States, 369 F.2d 960, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 934 (1967).
50. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(Robb, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1191-92.
52. Cases cited in note 16 supra.
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III. THE ALLEN CHARGE VS. THE ABA CHARGE:
WHICH IS BETTER?
The Allen charge and the ABA charge can be compared
with regard to at least five factors: coerciveness of wording,
vulnerability to additions and deletions, timing of issuance, con-
stitutionality and reviewability. Although it is not superior in
all areas, the ABA charge appears preferable to the Allen charge
in most respects.
A. COERCIVENESS OF WORDING
It is possible that even the mildest supplemental charge
urging agreement is, inherently, coercive.53 Whenever the jury
is precariously balanced, the likelihood that a supplemental
charge will have a coercive effect is great.54 Furthermore, this
effect, though coercive in fact, is often incapable of discovery"
since the coercion takes place in the individual juror's mind or
in the closed juryroom.
The circumstances in which these charges are given tend
to create the impression that the judge is demanding a verdict.5 0
Supplemental charges typically are issued after there have been
lengthy deliberations. Thus when the court returns the jury
to the juryroom, jurors may interpret this alone as a demand
for a verdict. The act itself places psychological pressure on
the jury. Almost any instruction may only increase this pres-
sure.
53. If a charge is interpreted by the jury to be a demand for a
verdict it improperly influences them to vote in a way they would
not do otherwise. It impinges upon their function as the sole fact
finders. Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894). Almost any
supplemental charge would be misinterpreted in this way.
54. Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 307 (1905).
55. United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 932-33 (1969). See also
Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J. 100, 105 (1968).
56. If there is a right to a mistrial this would infringe upon that
right. Some judges feel that to deny the defendant a chance for a
mistrial is improper. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 414-20
(3d Cir. 1969); United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 932 (7th Cir.
1969); United States v. Harris, 391 F.2d 348, 355 (6th Cir. 1968);
Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d 530, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Huff-
man v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 758-60 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J.,
dissenting). But see United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1341 (4th
Cir. 1970): "A defendant has no 'right' to either an irrational verdict
or a hung jury." Professor Zeisel has evidence which indicates that if
the unanimous jury verdict principle is dropped, the number of hung
juries would fall drastically. Zeisel, The Waning of the American Jury,
58 A.B.A.J. 367, 369 (1972).
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The pressure generally will be greatest on the minority.
The question typically is no longer whether the minority or
the majority will prevail, but whether the majority will win or
the jury will hang. In this context a minority juror may view
his refusal to agree as the lone obstacle to a verdict and thus
may change his vote solely to accommodate the majority.57 In
addition, the majority will use even the mildest charge as a
rhetorical device to persuade the minority that they must re-
verse their position in order to obtain a verdict.
Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that a carefully worded
supplemental charge urging agreement need not be coercive or
unfair.58 Though some psychological pressure may be unavoid-
able, a number of factors suggest that this should not be con-
sidered decisive when balanced against the broad benefits to
efficient judicial administration. First, careful wording of the
charge can minimize the chance that a juror will interpret the
judge's act of returning the jury to the juryroom to mean that
he is demanding a verdict. The minority is less likely to as-
sume that they are to sacrifice conscientiously held convictions
if the judge clearly states that they should not do so than if he
simply says "Please try again" and then returns them for de-
liberation. Also, the judge's encouragement may be the only
way that stubborn jurors can be persuaded to rethink their posi-
tions. 59
Despite the trial judge's unique ability to influence the
jury and the danger that his actions will have unwarranted
or coercive impact,60 it is not clear as an empirical matter that
jurors will allow themselves to be coerced into returning an
unfair verdict. A supplemental instruction urging agreement
57. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946); Thag-
gard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 740 (5th Cir. 1966) (Coleman, J.,
concurring specially); State v. Parker, 79 Wash. 2d 326, 485 P.2d 60,
65-66 (1971) (Rossellini, J., dissenting).
58. "We think that carefully worded and timed supplemental in-
structions are not necessarily unfair." United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d
930, 932 (7th Cir. 1969).
59. In addition to occupying the major position of respect in the
courtroom (see Note, supra note 14, at 126) the trial judge in federal
courts is allowed to aid the jury with advice. Thus the jury has the
benefit of an impartial lawyer to aid them in deliberation. Querica v.
United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469-70 (1933).
60. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court indi-
cated that the major function of the jury was to preclude the existence
of plenary power in the judge. Id. at 156.
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is not self-enforcing,61 and the jury may, and often does,0 2 dis-
regard it. One juror, by refusing to assent, can have the last
word and dictate a hung jury. Moreover, studies indicate that
what the judge tells the jury probably will not be accepted if
the advice is inconsistent with their concept of the evidence. 8
Furthermore, if the instruction clearly is improper the court
will be reversed on appeal.
For these reasons the real issue is not whether any form
of supplemental instruction urging agreement is proper, but
rather what form the instrucion should take. Many cases have
clearly defined the Allen charge to be the outer limit within
which all variations must lie.0 4  With the ABA alternative
available the question now is whether the courts should ban
the use of the Allen charge completely.
The most frequently criticized part of the Allen charge is
the wording singling out the minority and directing them alone
to reexamine their thinking. 65 This places unnecessary psych-
ological pressure on them to concur with the majority because
it is possible that either side may be wrong.6 The minority is
indirectly told to look beyond the evidence for its decision and
to be influenced "by some sort of Gallup Poll in the juryroom."' 7
Furthermore, the Allen charge's emphasis on minority reexamina-
tion equips the majority with a formidable forensic weapon.
Majority jurors may well assert that the court has indicated
that it believes the minority is acting unreasonably and minority
jurors unskilled in argument may meekly acquiesce. Thus the
charge may discourage free and open discussion and inhibit
rather than promote deliberation. 8  More importantly, critics
61. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.4, at 243 (1965).
62. See Seiden v. United States, 16 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1926);
cf. Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d 150 (1955).
63. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 427 (1966); Note,
supra note 55, at 136 & n.111. Cf. Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227,
114 A.2d 150 (1955).
64. See cases cited in note 9 supra.
65. See cases cited in note 27 supra.
66. Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1963). See
Note, supra note 55, at 140.
67. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417 (3d Cir. 1969).
See also Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1966).
68. See Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1962);
State v. Parker, 79 Wash. 2d 326, 485 P.2d 60, 66 (1971).
The give-and-take of group deliberation screens out errors, ne-
gates biases, and eliminates erroneous hypotheses to a far greater
extent than individual deliberations. It was found that the
interaction during deliberation was the crucial difference that
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argue that a minority juror may reasonably feel from the
court's actions and statements that the court itself agrees with
the majority.69 Since the court is the impartial expert, and the
juror the rank amateur,7 0 a juror may feel he should acquiesce.
This thrust of the Allen charge has been defended as simply
common sense advice.7 1 Reexamination when heavily outnum-
bered is exactly what reasonable men should do. Any group in
a heated discussion would profit from this advice. However,
the underlying premise of this argument is weak. A reasonable
juror immediately reexamines his thinking when he finds him-
self in the minority. A supplemental instruction urging him
to reexamine his position again is simply a redundancy which
can be interpreted to mean that the court wants a majority ver-
dict. "Common sense" advice at this point becomes highly
coercive. "Even patent truths are objectionable ... if they
seem to the jury to be coercive, and if their effect is to induce
jurors to surrender their own conscientious convictions for the
sake of acquiescence with their fellows."72
A major change made by the ABA charge, and some critics
say the only change,73 is to direct every juror to reexamine
his position rather than the minority alone. The obvious pur-
pose of this modification is to place less pressure on the min-
ority74 while encouraging the majority also to reexamine their
position. The basic thinking behind the Allen charge, that the
minority should reexamine their views solely because they are
the minority, is discarded. The ABA feels that if each juror
reassesses his views it will lead to more fruitful deliberation.
However, the question arises whether this slight verbal
made group decisions more than just a pooling of individuals
without the give-and-take of deliberation.
C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND T=E JURY 26-27 (1962). See Gurnee, A
Comparison of Collective and Individual Judgments of Facts, 21 J. ExP.
PSYCHOL. 106-12 (1937).
69. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417 (3d Cir. 1969);
State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 542, 353 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1960).
70. See Farley, Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial
Process, 42 YAiE L.J. 194, 212 (1932); Soper, The Charge To the Jury,
1 F.R.D. 540.
71. United States v. Johnson, 543 F.2d 626, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(Robb, J., dissenting).
72. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CRmnirM. § 502, at
354 (1969).
73. United States v. Johnson, 432 F.2d 626, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
The court felt that the ABA changes had not "in any meaningful sense,
recommended abandonment of the Allen charge."
74. ABA PROJECT, supra note 29, at 147.
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change will make any real difference. Of course the weapon
for argument which the ABA gives the majority is less formida-
ble than that given by the Allen charge. Indeed, the minority
now may argue that the majority has been directed to recon-
sider.7 5 Yet due to the remote chance of the majority capitu-
lating, the fact remains that the jury may believe that the court
is speaking to the minority alone.
A second difference between the Allen and the ABA charges
is in their treatment of the individual juror's opinion. Al-
though its major emphasis is on minority reexamination, the
Allen charge, on close reading, impliedly warns jurors that they
should not surrender conscientiously held convictions." It in-
forms the jury that the "verdict must be the verdict of each
individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion
of his fellows, '7 7 implying that the court is not demanding a
verdict. The ABA charge, however, gives greater emphasis to
this point. It specifically tells jurors not to surrender con-
scientiously held convictions, and states that jurors should not
return a verdict unless it is the independent judgement of all
of them.78
Since the charges are delivered to the jury orally, this dif-
ference in degree of emphasis may be crucial.79 Jurors usually
75. Since the ABA charge encourages each juror not to hesitate to
reexamine his thinking the minority may argue that both the majority
and minority position should be rethought. This device makes it as
clear as possible that the court is not favoring majority thinking solely
because it is majority thinking.
76. The charge does not directly state that each juror should only
vote his conscientiously held beliefs. It does say that the juror's vote
should not be a "mere acquiescence in the conclusions of his fellows."
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896). The ABA charge spe-
cifically states that "no juror should surrender his honest conviction as
to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of
his fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict." ABA
PROJECT, supra note 29, at 145 (§ 5.4(a) (v)).
77. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
78. Subsections (i) and (iii) of the ABA charge demand, first, that
to return a verdict each juror must agree thereto, and second, that after
an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors
each juror must decide the case for himself. ABA PROJECT, supra note
29, at 145.
79. The degree of emphasis in any instruction is important becausejurors probably cannot scrutinize every word or act on the basis of
subtle distinctions in a charge's wording. Morgan, Instructing the Jury
Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HAmv. L. REv. 59, 63 & n.1
(1933). Appellate courts have recognized this idea by labelling some
errors in instruction as "harmless" when they do not upset the general
impression which the charge as a whole conveys. "A defendant is en-
titled to a fair trial but not a perfect one." Lutwak v. United States,
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will only hear the supplemental charge once. They may not
give proper weight to the Allen charge's fleeting admonition
against surrendering their beliefs. By contrast, four of the five
parts of the ABA charge indicate in one way or another that it
is the individual juror's opinion which should control his vote. 0
The ABA wording also better communicates the idea that
the court is not demanding a verdict. In its one excursion into
the supplemental charge area in recent years, the Supreme
Court held that trial judges may not demand a verdict.s' The
Allen charge comes close to doing so by implying that there is
a duty to decide the case.82 It states that it is the jury's duty
to decide the case if they can "conscientiously do so," and that
they "should listen with a disposition to be convinced."8 ' The
ABA charge specifically rejects this idea and instead tells the
jury that their only duty is to "deliberate. '8 4
The Allen charge also tells the jury that "complete cer-
tainty cannot be expected" in all cases.8 5 This statement is
deleted in the ABA charge. Criticism of the statement is proper
since it is obviously incomplete8 6 as a statement of the reason-
able doubt standard, '8 7 and thus could create at least two mis-
conceptions in the minds of jurors. First, although an accurate
instruction in reasonable doubt will inform each juror that
344 U.S. 604, 619 (1952); United States v. Porter, 386 F.2d 270, 276 (6th
Cir. 1967); Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 402-03 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
Cf. FED. R. CRnV. P., Rule 52A.
80. ABA PRoJECT, supra note 29, at 145 (§ 5.4(a) (i)-(iii) & (v)).
81. Jenkins v . United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965).
82. The Allen charge states that it is the jury's "duty to decide the
case if they could conscientiously do so. . . ." Allen v. United States,
164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896). This wording is confusing. The limiting phrase
in the "duty" is so broad that there really is no duty to decide at all.
However, a juror who hears the phrase just once might lay emphasis
solely on the words "duty" and "decide" and thus take a mistaken im-
pression of what the court is saying. Cf. Note, supra note 55, at 136.
83. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
84. ABA PROJECT, supra note 29, at 145 (§ 5.4(a) (ii) ). The last
statement in the ABA charge reminds each juror that he should not
sacrifice conscientiously held convictions solely for the purpose of re-
turning a verdict.
85. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
86. See Mathes, Jury Instructions and Forms for Federal Crim-
inal Cases, 27 F.RX). 39, 48 (1961) (Instruction 2.01), where a good
example of a complete reasonable doubt instruction is given.
87. This may be seen as an independent reason why trial judges
should avoid the Allen charge. It does little good to have a supple-
mental charge that, regardless of its other merits, is unacceptable be-
cause of a one sided reference to the reasonable doubt standard. This
alone may disqualify the Allen charge in the minds of some judges.
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complete certainty is not required, it will balance that standard
by reminding jurors that a very careful and cautious analysis of
the evidence is required before a person votes for conviction.8
If jurors apply the abbreviated standard of the Allen charge
to their individual opinions it may seem to favor conviction.
A juror who is not absolutely certain may decide his doubt is
not a legally reasonable one. Second, a jury may interpret this
statement as applying to the jury as a whole, not to each juror
individually, and thus infer that when most of the jurors are
certain, a verdict may be returned. Either interpretation is
dangerous and the ABA deletion is an improvement.8 9
Although the ABA wording seems preferable to the Allen
wording, this change may cause the new charge to be a less
effective tool for reducing the number of hung juries. The ABA
charge does not emphasize the point that a juror should change
his opinion if he becomes convinced it is erroneous. Instead,
by emphasizing the importance of retaining conscientious con-
victions, the charge may leave the juror exactly where he was
before it was issued.9 0 In fact, a juror who is close to changing
his mind could understand the ABA charge to mean that he
should continue to vote his original position. A juror who feels
the defendant has been proven guilty but seeks to avoid the
unpleasant task of so adjuging him will find it comparatively
easier to hang the jury after an ABA charge.
However, there are two reasons why the increased possibil-
ity of hung juries should not justify rejection of the ABA
charge. First, it is a distinct possibility that such an increase
would represent, at least in part, those juries which were being
improperly coerced by the Allen charge. In other words, al-
though the price may be substantial in terms of judicial time
and efficiency it is the necessary price of justice. Second, no
jurisdiction which has adopted instructions similar to the ABA
charge has found it necessary to return to a stronger supple-
mental instruction.9 1 This suggests that any increase in hung
juries has not been found to be especially overburdening.
88. See note 86 supra.
89. The ABA charge also deletes the Allen statement about "equally
honest, equally intelligent" jurors. This too is an improvement be-
cause these statements, which jurors realize are not accurate, may serve
to make the rest of the charge less credible by implication.
90. United States v. Johnson, 432 F.2d 626, 637 (1970) (Robb, J.,
dissenting); Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy And The Hung Jury:
A Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REv. 123, 148 (1967).
91. Arizona, in State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197 (1959),
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Careful examination of the wording of both charges shows
that each one asks the juror to perform a difficult feat:9 2 he
must seriously reexamine his thinking with a predisposition to
be convinced by his fellow jurors and yet retain conscientiously
held convictions. The ABA charge's wording is an improve-
ment because it tells the entire jury, not just the minority, to
reexamine their thinking. A further and perhaps more sig-
nificant improvement in the ABA charge is the shift in em-
phasis from minority reexamination to retention of conscien-
tiously held beliefs, thus minimizing the fear that a juror might
not vote his conscience because he feels the court wants a major-
ity verdict.
B. ADDITION AN DEIETIoNs
Any model supplemental charge urging agreement will be
subject to additions and perhaps deletions by trial courts.93
Additions are certainly necessary so that a court can tailor its
comments to the peculiar problems of particular cases. This
means that the circuits will have to develop guidelines for what
is or is not a proper addition through case law. Experience
with the Allen charge has provided some general guidelines. 4
and Montana, in State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054 (1960),
rejected the Allen charge because of its potential for coercion.
92. Cases cited in note 27 supra, especially State v. Parker.
93. It will also be subject to paraphrases which may or may not
communicate the ideas of the model charge. Each paraphrase will call
for a review by the appellate court to determine if it is a permissible
one. The ABA Commentary specifically allows paraphrases and even
gives an example. ABA PRoJEcT, supra note 29, at 146. The Thomas
court implied at one point that it would not allow paraphrasing of the
ABA charge because it was "through just such a process that the courts
were led into ... increasing difficulties ... ." United States v.
Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1971). And it indicated that
any changes in the charge's wording must receive approbation. Id.
Judge Robb, in dissent, pointed out that Supreme Court precedent itself
had not prohibited trial court paraphrasing and thus it was unlikely that
the circuit court ruling would either. Id. at 1192.
94. 'For example, there have been reversals where, in addition
to reading the instruction approved in Allen, the trial court read the
Allen reasoning to the jury, which was stated in Allen as follows:
[T]he verdict of the jury should represent the opinion of each
individual juror, it by no means follows that opinions may
not be changed by conference in the jury-room. The very ob-ject of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison
of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves. It
certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not listen
with deference to the arguments and with a distrust of his
own judgment, if he finds a large majority of the jury taking a
different view of the case from what he does himself. It cannot
be that each juror should go into the jury-room with a blind
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Most Allen charge reversals do not result from the basic
charge itself, but rather from improper additions.05 Although
it does not make sense to fault the basic charge for cases where
trial courts have improperly added to it,96 the fact remains that
the Allen charge has shown itself to be a springboard for many
improper instructions. For example, some trial courts have
tried to read the Supreme Court's reasoning in Allen to the
jury in addition to the charge the Court approved.9' One case
shows thirteen additions to the basic Allen wording. 8 Al-
though the ABA charge makes it very clear that the entire
charge is to be given, thus minimizing the problem of improper
deletions, it is just as amenable as the Allen charge to abuses
from improper additions. Circuits which imply that they will
not allow additions99 may find their position untenable be-
cause trial courts must be able to make appropriate comments
to deal with particular jury problems. 100
One desirable addition to the ABA charge, or any model
supplemental instruction, would be a complete reinstruction on
the reasonable doubt standard.1'0 One of the major failures
of the Allen charge is that it could be interpreted by the jury
to modify the reasonable doubt standard. 0 2 If the jury is dead-
locked properly, not over emotions or personalities, a slight
shift in the jury's understanding of this standard for conviction
determination that the verdict shall represent his opinion of the
case at that moment ....
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896). See Nigro v. United
States, 4 F.2d 781, 783-84 (8th Cir. 1925); Stewart v. United States,
300 F. 769, 785-87 (8th Cir. 1924). The cases cited in note 154 infra
give examples of added phrases which have been held coercive.
95. See note 94 supra and note 154 infra for examples.
96. Note, supra note 55, at 104-05.
97. See note 94 supra.
98. Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 757-58 (5th Cir. 1962).
99. See note 93 supra. The Thomas court's statements as to "varia-
tions" of the ABA charge may be read to encompass additions and
deletions as well as paraphrases.
100. For example, in United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459 (2d
Cir. 1963), the court reassured a confused jury that the time it had
spent was not inordinate in view of the great mass of evidence in the
case. Id. at 483. The court also recalled the jury on one occasion to
re-emphasize the necessity of each juror voting his conscientiously held
convictions. All requests by the jury were fulfilled by the court (e.g.,
a second Allen charge) and the court emphasized that there was no
need for haste in arriving at a verdict. Id. at 484.
101. A good example of a proper reasonable doubt instruction is
found in Mathes, Jury Instructions and Forms for Federal Criminal
Cases, 27 F.R.D. 39, 48 (1961) (Instruction 2.01).
102. See text accompanying notes 85-89 supra.
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could prove decisive. Because any supplemental instruction
urging agreement is likely to have some subtle impact on the
jury's comprehension of the reasonable doubt standard, com-
plete redefinition of the standard seems desirable.1 0 3
This reinstruction will be especially helpful because the
standard is really so ambiguous, 0 4 although it appears simple.
Applying the standard to close facts is a difficult task. More-
over, it is one thing for a juror to hear the definition in the
initial charge when it is just an abstract concept, and it is an-
other for him to hear the same thing later and apply it after
he has heard his colleagues' arguments .in the juryroom. Also,
there may be a danger that factions within the jury have de-
veloped a reasonable doubt standard which, as a matter of law,
is inaccurate. 0 5 A reinstruction may make it easier for a juror
to decide for himself how the real standard should be applied,
rather than simply accepting the standard as it has evolved dur-
ing deliberation. 0 6
From the standpoint of additions and deletions the ABA
charge has failed adequately to solve the problems experienced
with the Allen charge. The only difference between the two
is the fact that the ABA charge is explicit in not allowing de-
letions. However, this was impliedly the case with the Allen
charge.1 7 Both charges will have to be scrutinized carefully
103. By implication a complete redefinition of the reasonable doubt
standard will also redefine the burden of proof
104. It has been called "undefinable" because the words are so
basic. H. KA=vEn & H. ZEIsEL, THE AavnmmcAN JuRy 189 & n.5 (1966).
See also C. McCoRmvcK, EvmENcE § 321, at 682 (1954); 9 L. WiGMoE,
EvmiNcE § 2497, at 317-20 (1940); Annot., 147 A.L.R. 1047 (1943); Mor-
gan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47
HARv. L. Ray. 59, 63-64 (1933). But when the jury asks for further
definition it is usually given in spite of the difficulty. Annot., 147
A.L.R. 1047 (1943). Kalven and Zeisel further state: "Given the am-
biguity of the reasonable doubt formula it is likely that it is not
understood in exactly the same way by all jurors." H. KArvEa & H.
ZE sEz, supra, at n.5.
105. It appears that after any appreciable deliberation time the fac-
tions which have formed within the jury may distort legal principles in
order to persuade other jurors. Note, supra note 55, at 110-11 & n.36.
106. This suggestion has been rejected in at least one case. Buder
v. Bell, 306 F.2d 71, 76 (6th Cir. 1962). The circuit court felt the trial
court had adequately charged on reasonable doubt and presumption of
innocence in the original charge. The court felt the essential goal of
supplemental instructions is to get jurors to reason together and not
reemphasize legal rules which were given originally. But a more recent
case has indicated that the proposed reinstruction may be useful
United States v. Winn, 411 F.2d 415, 417 (10th Cir. 1969).
107. The Allen charge has often been defended as a "carefully bal-
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by appellate courts in individual cases in order to prevent im-
proper additions or deletions.
C. TIMING PROBLEMS
A major problem with any supplemental charge urging
agreement is determining when during deliberations the charge
should be given. The timing of supplemental instructions is a
discretionary matter for the trial court and is not normally re-
viewable unless the charge is clearly premature, in the sense
that the jury has not been given a reasonable time to agree.108
Even now the limits of what is a reasonable time have not been
defined. 0 9 Overall deference to the discretion of the trial court
is almost invariably the controlling factor.110
The ABA charge specifically approves the use of trial court
discretion in timing of issuance' and it thus seems unlikely
that appellate courts will show any great propensity to reverse
on grounds of premature timing. The issue of whether a charge
anced" method of reminding jurors of their elementary obligations.
Fulwood v. United States, 369 F.2d 960, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger,
J.). If any key phrase is removed this balance no longer exists, and
thus deletion would seem to be improper. Also, the Supreme Court
approved only one wording and nowhere implied that there should be
deletions.
108. Although courts pay lip service to this principle, Green v.
United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854 n.3 (5th Cir. 1962), there has been no
federal case where a reversal was posited solely on the premature nature
of the supplemental charge. See Miller v. State, 10 Md. App. 157, 268
A.2d 596 (1970).
109. The problem of establishing timing standards is discussed in
Note, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Critical Look at the "Allen
Charge," 31 U. Cm. L. REV. 386, 391-92 (1964); Note, supra note 90, at
132-33; Comment, Defusing the Dynamite Charge: A Critique of Allen
and Its Progeny, 36 TENN. L. Rnv. 749, 756-58 (1969). Examples of what
has been considered a "reasonable time" are legion. E.g., Mills v.
Tinsley, 314 F.2d 311 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 847 (1963)
(supplemental charge given after more than a day of deliberation);
United States v. Furlong, 194 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 950
(1952) (supplemental charge given after more than three hours of
deliberation). Cf. Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.
1962) (supplemental charge given after 1 hour and 5 minutes of de-
liberation).
110. For example, in Walker v. United States, 342 F.2d 22 (5th Cir.
1962), even though the foreman had stated that the jury was close to
agreement, the court issued an Allen charge. The Fifth Circuit, a circuit
usually critical of the Allen charge, refused to reverse, saying timing
was within the discretion of the trial judge. Id. at 26. Besides show-
ing great deference to trial judges on timing, the circuits have been
erratic in applying even the liberal reversal standards. Comment,
supra note 109, at 757; Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 177, 208-10 (1965).
111. ABA PROJECT, supra note 29, at 145 (§ 5.4(b) (v)).
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is premature is also less likely to arise inasmuch as the ABA
charge has already been given as part of the court's initial in-
struction to the jury. Also, since all the factors concerning a
charge interrelate, the improved wording of the ABA charge
may make it less conducive to coercion even if premature.
However, while retaining trial court discretion, the appel-
late courts should establish a guideline to aid trial courts in de-
ciding when to give a supplemental instruction. Otherwise the
fact that the appellate courts so eagerly embrace the ABA
standards while rejecting the Allen charge might be misinter-
preted as encouragement to issue the new supplemental charge.
Accordingly, it would be an improvement if the circuit courts
using the ABA charge instructed their trial courts that the
charge should not be used except in cases of clear necessity.
For instance, they might demand that trial courts not issue sup-
plemental instructions unless the jury indicates its disagree-
ment in some external way. The mere fact that a jury spends
a great deal of time on what the court considers a simple case
should not be grounds for the issuance of a supplemental charge.
In addition to ingraining a healthy distrust for supplemen-
tal charges urging agreement, the circuit courts should encour-
age trial judges to use their other powers for initially dealing
with jury deadlock. For instance, in the Thomas case, the court
was asked by the jury to read back certain testimony. The
court acquiesced, and while the jury was in the courtroom en-
couraged them to reach a verdict. Shortly thereafter, the jury
returned with a verdict of guilty. As the dissent points out,11 2
it is unclear whether the jury was persuaded by the evidence
readback, the Allen charge, or both. However, it is quite possi-
ble that the evidence readback alone would have persuaded the
jury to return a guilty verdict, and a reversal would have been
avoided. If the jury did not respond to the readback perhaps
the judge then could have used a supplemental charge urging
agreement.
Other powers are also available to the trial judge. He can
summarize the evidence, comment on the evidence, and in-
struct on the law.113 In addition to providing for a stenographic
112. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(Robb, J., dissenting).
113. In fact, in the federal system it is clear that the court has a
duty to use these powers to aid the jury in its fact finding function.
United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1340 (4th Cir. 1970). While
some states have restricted the powers which the court historically has
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readback of evidence the judge may make his own fair explana-
tion of what the jury has seen to aid them in remembering.'1 4
He can even comment on the evidence if the comments are fair
and the jurors are told that they may disregard them if they
choose." 5 The judge can do this before or after the jury has
retired." 6 Although these powers may be misused it is proba-
bly easier for appellate courts to identify and remedy a misuse
of them than to perceive whether a supplemental charge has
been coercive in fact.
Perhaps the most potent weapon the court has for ending
jury disagreement is simply the power to instruct on the law." 7
By reminding the jury what its function is, the judge may be
able to stop personality contests from dominating the jury's
deliberation. As has been mentioned," 8 a reinstruction on the
reasonable doubt standard may aid jurors significantly. In
addition, anytime the judge feels that the jury does not under-
stand a legal point he may reinstruct on that point." 9 He may
also inquire as to whether the jury understands various
points. 20
Encouraging trial courts to deal with deadlocked juries
through other means than the supplemental charge urging
agreement should reduce significantly the workload at the ap-
used to deal with the jury. e.g., Aniz. CONST. art. 6, § 12; S. C. CoDE
ANN. § 38-303 (1962); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 270.23 (1957), the federal
courts retain these powers. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288
(1930). The Chicago Jury Study found federal judges are more active
than state judges who have similar powers. H. KALE & H. ZmnsEL,
supra note 104, at 421, Table 106 at 422 (1966). See also United States
v. Betancourt, 427 F.2d 851, 854 (5th Cir. 1970).
114. Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 624-25 (1894). It is gen-
erally assumed that the power to comment on the evidence encom-
passes the power to summarize the evidence. 9 L. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2551, at 504-05 (3d Ed. 1940).
115. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469-70 (1933); Starr v.
United States, 153 U.S. 614, 625-26 (1894); Hicks v. United States, 150
U.S. 442, 450-53 (1893); Hale v. United States, 435 F.2d 737, 742-43 (5th
Cir. 1970); Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 402-03 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 925-26 (2d Cir. 1945) (Learned
Hand, J.).
116. Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135 (1920); Simmons
v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 155 (1891).
117. E.g., Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir.
1962) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
118. See text accompanying notes 101-06 supra.
119. 89 C.J.S. Trial, § 475 (1955).
120. A good example of a judicious use of this power is given in
Kawakita v. United States, 190 F.2d 506, 521 & n.17 (9th Cir.), aff'd,
343 U.S. 717 (1951).
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pellate level. Appellate courts will find fewer supplemental
charge cases to scruitinize, which will be a saving of appellate
time, and when they do have to review communications to the
jury such communications will be in forms easier for them to
evaluate than the supplemental charge urging agreement.
Once the trial judge's other powers are exhausted he then
should consider whether it is a proper time to issue a supple-
mental charge. But even then trial judges should be wary of
issuing a supplemental charge. Appellate courts should encour-
age a healthy distrust for even the ABA charge and demand
that it be used solely as a last resort.
D. CoNsTIoINALY
Arguably, if a judge's instruction is found on review to
have been coercive in fact, it has infringed upon the defendant's
right to a jury decision of his case and is thus a violation of
due process.121 The principle underlying the requirement of a
unanimous jury verdict 122 is undermined if that unanimity is
not arrived at independently but is coerced by the court.223
Although many supplemental charges have been held to be er-
ror, or have been found to be coercive within the facts of par-
ticular cases, none has been declared unconstitutional How-
ever, it seems likely that a court could word a supplemental
121. Mfis v. Tinsley, 314 F.2d 311 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 847 (1963).
122. A unanimous verdict is required because of the magnitude
of the consequences, because of the improbability that twelve
men of disparate experience and backgrounds could each err in
arriving at the same conclusion. As to guilt, only a high degree
of certainty can salve the conscience of society (as represented
by the judge) and overcome reluctance to impose punishment
upon one of its members.
8 J MooRE, FEDERAL PRACMICE § 31.04[1], at 31-32 (2d ed. 1970). See
Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 838 (6th Cir. 1953). See also
Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948); FEn. R. ClM P.,
Rule 31(a). Even if something less than unanimity is adopted in the
federal system it would still demand that a juror vote his conscience
and not agree solely in order to return a verdict. See Apodaca v. Ore-
gon, 462 P.2d 691 (Ore. 1969), cert. granted, 400 U.S. 901 (1970), where
the Supreme Court has agreed to review the necessity of the unani-
mity principle. See also Zeisel, The Waning of the American Jury,
58 A.B.A.J. 367 (1972).
123. Unanimity is a barrier to arbitrary judicial power. Thompson
v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1898). The verdict is to be based on the
evidence alone. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). A unanimous
verdict which occurs because jurors believe that the judge is demanding
a verdict violates both of these principles.
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charge urging agreement in such a way that it would violate
due process.
The Allen charge has been criticized as unconstitutional
under two theories. Neither theory has received credence from
any court and one has been specifically rejected. The first
theory is simply put by Judge Brown, dissenting in Huffman v.
United States. 24 He feels that the Allen charge violates fund-
amental fairness because it demands a verdict by implying that
there is a duty to decide the case. His theory was accepted by
at least one other dissenter, 125 but no court has adopted it.
Judge Brown also feels that a defendant has a constitutional
right to a mistrial in the event of a hung jury because that
outcome is so obviously a part of our scheme of justice, and he
claims that the Allen charge infringes upon that right.1 20
The second theory has been propounded by commenta-
tors.1 27 It is based on recent Supreme Court cases which deal
with the integrity of the jury.128 These cases attempt to limit
the outside influence to which a jury is exposed in order that
it may decide the case on the evidence alone. For example, in
Sheppard v. Maxwell 29 the Supreme Court decided that pre-
trial publicity was so intense that the defendant was denied a
fair trial. The commentators urge that the theory underlying
these decisions is broad enough to reach the case in which judi-
cial instruction encourages jurors to consider factors beyond
the evidence and argument in open court. They argue that the
Allen charge violates the principle of deciding the case on the evi-
dence alone by telling jurors to look beyond the evidence and
consider the way other jurors are voting in deciding the de-
fendant's guilt or innocence. Of course this criticism extends
the Supreme Court case law far beyond the facts of the cases
and also overlooks the essential conference nature of the Ameri-
can jury system. 30 It seems inconsistent to say that a juror
124. 297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1962).
125. Wisdom, J., dissenting in Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d
127, 129-31 (5th Cir. 1962).
126. Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1962)
(Brown, J., dissenting).
127. Note, supra note 90, at 136-44; Comment, supra note 109, at
750-55.
128. E.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Parker v.
Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Turner v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 466 (1965); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
129. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
130. "The proponents of the jury system maintain that a greater de-
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can consider the arguments of his colleagues without agreeing
that he should be able to consider their votes as simply a re-
flection of how his own arguments are perceived. At least one
court has rejected this criticism of the Allen charge. 3 1
Both unconstitutionality theories are weak. Both impli-
citly rely on the proposition that the Allen charge is necessarily
coercive, a proposition for which as yet there is no empirical
prooi. 3 2  The Supreme Court has specifically said that the
charge is constitutional. 3 3 Circuit courts which have rejected
the Allen charge are quite explicit about saying that the issue
arises only under their supervisory powers and not as a ques-
tion of the charge's constitutionality.134
The ABA charge has not been criticized as unconstitutional
Since the charge makes it very clear that it is not demanding
a verdict it should pass the test formulated by Judge Brown in
Huffman. Arguably the ABA charge protects the right to a
mistrial, assuming such a right exists-first, by emphasizing
that each juror must vote his convictions, second, by making it
clear that no juror should change his vote solely to return a
verdict, and third, by telling the jury there is only a duty to
"deliberate" and not decide.
The ABA charge also will probably pass the test of consti-
tutionality used by the commentators. 30 Although the charge
does tell jurors to be influenced by the arguments of their fel-
lows and to change their vote if convinced they are wrong, it
gree of accuracy is guaranteed from this process of give and take which
is invariably essential to reaching unanimity." United States v. Fiora-
vanti, 412 F.2d 407, 418 (3d Cir. 1969). "The distinctive strength and
safeguard of the jury system is that the jury operates as a group."
Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 V. L. Rnv. 1055, 1067
(1964).
131. United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1969).
132. There has been no showing that the Allen charge results in a
disproportionately high number of guilty verdicts. United States v.
Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Robb, J., dissenting);
United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1970). This is im-
possible to guage without empirical research because acquittals are not
reported.
133. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1187 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). Circuit courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's orders
here as supervisory. Id. at 1184-86 (discussion); United States v.
Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1969).
135. See note 127 supra. At least one of the commentators who has
criticized the Allen charge has indicated that he feels that a charge
similar to the ABA charge is not only constitutional but desirable.
Comment, supra note 109, at 761.
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does not tell them to be influenced by the numerical break-
down of the jury.
The only conclusion that can be drawn from these tests
of constitutionality is that it appears the ABA charge is not
quite as amenable to the criticisms as the Allen charge. But
the criticisms themselves are weak. The fact that the ABA
charge may be comparatively less vulnerable to weak constitu-
tional criticisms should not be a factor in deciding whether it
is an improvement on the Allen charge. Standing alone both
charges are constitutional.
E. REvrEwABm=
One of the major criticisms of the use of supplemental
charges urging agreement is that it is all but impossible for ap-
pellate courts to decide if such a charge was coercive in fact.18 0
The difficulty lies in the fact that the coercion takes place in
the individual juror's mind or behind closed doors in the jury-
room. Appellate courts are forced to rely on inferences per-
ceived from external indications and real coercion may never
manifest itself in a manner that would appear in the record.137
This has led to the use of review standards which cannot really
accomplish a proper review.138
A commonly discussed test to discover whether a supple-
mental charge had a coercive effect upon the jury is whether the
charge started a new train of deliberation.' 3 9 Obviously this
test is unworkable because an appellate court cannot discover
what actually took place during the deliberations themselves.
The test becomes simply a label for an appellate court's con-
136. Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 839-40 (Alaska, 1971); Note, supra
note 90, at 135-37; Note, supra note 109, at 386-88; Comment, supra
note 109, at 759-60.
137. Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 839-40 (Alaska, 1971).
138. In some cases, the standards adopted by reviewing courts are
directly inconsistent. For instance, Weathers v. United States, 126 F.2d
118 (5th Cir. 1942), and United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.
1963), indicate that an appreciable time in deliberation after an Allen
charge implies lack of coercive impact, while United States v. Samuel
Dunkel & Co., 173 F.2d 506, 511 (2d Cir. 1949), and Kawakita v.
United States, 190 F.2d 506, 528 (9th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 717(1951), have been read to indicate that long deliberation periods after
an Allen charge indicate coercion. Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 177, 209-10(1965); Comment, supra note 109, at 757 & n.59. See also United
States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969); State v. Thomas, 86
Ariz. 161, 165-66, 342 P.2d 197, 200 (1959).
139. Such a test was used in State v. Pierce, 178 Iowa 417, 424,
159 N.W. 1050, 1054-55 (1916).
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clusions. Another device which appellate courts use may be
more constructive: if the jury returns immediately after a sup-
plemental charge, without time for further deliberation, with
a guilty verdict the reviewing court will imply coercion be-
cause there was no time for renewed deliberation. 1 0 However,
although this test may prove to be a more accurate method of
measuring the likelihood of coercion, it is useful in only a small
minority of cases.
Because tests like these have proven ineffective, circuit
courts have found themselves independently weighing the evi-
dence to see whether the possibility of coercion can be ignored
as harmless error.141 That is, if the evidence against the de-
fendant is "overwhelming" the reviewing court will affirm the
conviction.1 42 The appellate court's inquiry is not directed to
whether there was coercion in fact, but rather whether it ap-
pears to the court that the defendant is guilty. Thus some
defendants will be convicted even though their case was never
considered by a jury free of coercive influences-a right to
which the defendant is constitutionally entitled. Moreover, the
140. E.g., Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d 530 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v.
Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 436 (4th Cir. 1961); Stewart v. United States, 300
F. 769 (8th Cir. 1924); Peterson v. United States, 213 F. 20 (9th Cir.
1914). The application of this theory has been inconsistent. Compare
Wissel v. United States, 22 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1927) (jury returned 25
minutes after a supplemental charge; reversed), with Andrews v.
United States, 309 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 946
(1963) (jury returns 25 minutes after a supplemental charge; af-
firmed).
141. ABA PR iEcT, supra note 29, at 154. Note, On Instructing
Deadlocked Juries, 78 YAL.E L.J. 100, 142 (1968), states:
In deciding whether an error is harmless judges probably
should not consider the nature of the case and the evidence, or at
least not the way they do now. Courts are presently inclined
to refuse reversal in cases where the evidence was overwhelm-
ingly against the complaining party; any error in the instructions
is harmless since the jury would have come out the same way
without it.
142. For example, in Lias et al. v. United States, 51 F.2d 215 (4th
Cir.), aff-d, 284 U.S. 584 (1931) the court, while refusing to reverse,
stated:
In this case the evidence so overwhelmingly and conclusively
shows the guilt of defendants that, to constitute reversible
error, such error must have been of a character as to have been
clearly prejudicial to them. Such is not the case here.
51 F.2d at 218. See Boehm v. United States, 123 F.2d 791, 813 (8th Cir.
1941); State v. Mulhollen, 173 Iowa 242, 248, 155 N.W. 252, 254 (1915).
On the other hand, where the evidence is largely circumstantial or in
sharp conflict it is a factor in reversals. See Nigro v. United States,
4 F.2d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 1925); State v. Voeckell, 69 Ariz. 145, 157,
210 P.2d 972, 980 (1949) (Udall, J., dissenting).
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appellate court will not have searched the record for indications
of coercion, but will have balanced the evidence itself. In this
light, the evidence weighing test is improper.
In most cases, then, the circuits courts are left with the re-
sponsibility for simply looking at "all the circumstances" to de-
cide if a supplemental charge urging agreement was in fact
coercive or had a "substantial propensity" to be coercive.' 43
Such an examination requires the reviewing court to spend an
inordinate amount of time on each case since it must make sure
that there is no hint of coercion in the entire record. The prob-
lem is compounded by the fact that the use of supplemental
charges urging agreement appears to be increasing. 144 One
judge has asserted that these charges are almost certain to be
given in any case which has been hard fought and in which the
jury stays out for any appreciable time.145 The increasing fre-
quency of supplemental charges may save time for trial courts
by preventing retrials, but appellate judges have pointed out
that these gains are offset by increases in appellate workloads.
Although the "all the circumstances" test is time consum-
ing,146 erratic' 47 and difficult to apply,' 48 it is not always in-
effective. The many reversals based on supplemental charges
urging agreement so attest. Courts reversing these charges
frequently point to parts of the transcript' 49 or incidents in the
trial' 50 which indicate that the jury was coerced.
However, the unusual amount of appellate time that is
spent on Allen charge appeals has been a major reason for
143. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 391 F.2d 348 (6th Cir. 1968);
Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1962). In Powell the
court stated that there should be scrutiny of the "facts of each case and
the exact words used." 297 F.2d at 322.
144. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
United States v. Johnson, 432 F.2d 626, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
145. Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 & n.1 (5th Cir.
1962) (Brown, J., dissenting).
146. See note 151 infra.
147. See note 138 supra.
148. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
cf. Jackson v. United States, 386 F.2d 641, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
149. E.g., Walker v. United States, 342 F.2d 22, 25-26 (5th Cir.
1965); Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318, 319-20 (5th Cir. 1961);
Berger v. United States, 62 F.2d 438, 438-39 (10th Cir. 1932).
150. Campbell v. United States, 316 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1963); United
States v. Smith, 303 F.2d 341, 342-43 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 435 (4th Cir. 1961); Nigro v. United States, 4 F.2d




changing to the ABA charge.15 1 There is evidence that the cir-
cuit courts which have adopted the ABA charge will apply a
presumption of propriety when that charge is issued'5 2 and will
not apply the "all the circumstances" test on review. This
should significantly reduce the time spent in reviewing these
charges. However, the most recent Supreme Court case deal-
ing with supplemental instructions may be read to demand a
complete review on all the circumstances of these charges"5 3
and it is submitted that any less rigorous review is unwar-
ranted. Although the ABA charge may be an improvement
over the Allen charge, it certainly does not contain any magic
words which rid the instruction of the potential for coercion.
Some juries may still respond improperly. If supplemental in-
structions urging agreement are allowed in any form they
should be scrupulously reviewed on "all the circumstances,"
even if this does not reduce circuit court workloads.
There is a way, however, that the appellate courts may re-
duce their workloads somewhat without reducing protection for
the defendant. Rather than simply recommending that trial
judges use the ABA standards, they should require the new
charge. Trial judges have traditionally been allowed great lee-
way in the wording of supplemental charges urging agree-
ment'5 4 and it seems likely that even strongly recommending
the use of a particular format may not restrict them One cir-
151. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Our conclusion that the conviction must be reversed for ac-
tual, though undesigned, coercion of the jury is an appraisal we
could make only after a very considerable expenditure of judi-
cial time and energy.
Id. at 1184. See United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir.
1969).
152. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1184-86 & n.60 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417-20 (3d Cir.
1969).
153. In Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965), the Court used
the "all the circumstances" test. Id. at 446. In Lias et al. v. United
States, 51 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1931), affd, 284 U.S. 584 (1931), the court
stated that "the giving of special instructions of the character of those
given here should not be approved without a careful analysis of them."
Id. at 218. It can be argued that these precedents demand that the cir-
cuits retain this strict scrutiny of the supplemental charge.
154. Some examples of improper additions which trial courts used in
spite of circuit court rejection of them are: Green v. United States,
309 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1962) ("the majority will have better judg-
ment"); Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318, 319 (5th Cir. 1961) ("It
is no credit to a juror to stand out in a pure spirit of stubborness");
Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (the court
openly indicated that it thought the defendant was guilty).
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cuit court already has been faced with a progression of cases
where, although its recommendations to use the ABA charge
have become stronger and stronger, some trial courts have not
yet responded. 155 Thus circuit courts should demand that when
a trial judge issues a supplemental instruction urging agree-
ment it contain all five elements of the ABA charge. This will
lower the number of clearly improper charges which are given,
and thus should reduce the number of supplementary charge ap-
peals. The penalty for failure to issue the ABA charge must
be reversal.
Some circuit courts may be reluctant to apply such an ap-
proach in the situation where a trial court issues a verbatim
Allen charge citing that case.' 50 However, since the Supreme
Court only approved the Allen charge and did not demand that
it be used, a circuit court should be able to use its supervisory
power to require that the district courts under it adhere to a
different standard. In fact, it can be argued that use of the
supervisory power is especially appropriate in an area where
the Supreme Court now refuses to take certiorari. 15' This re-
fusal can be interpreted to mean that the Court intends to let
the problem be solved initially by the circuit courts. Especially
important is the fact that when some circuits have adopted the
ABA charge the Supreme Court has not overruled them. 5 8
155. The Tenth Circuit started recommending milder supplemental
instructions than the Allen charge in Buroughs v. United States, 365
F.2d 431, 434 (10th Cir. 1966). It continued through Burrup v. United
States, 371 F.2d 556, 558 (10th Cir. 1967), and in United States v. Wynn,
415 F.2d 135, 137 (10th Cir. 1969), the court indicated extreme dis-
pleasure with the failure of district courts to heed its advice, but still
refused to reverse. The Circuit is still recommending, the district
courts are still not listening, and the Circuit is still not reversing.
See Munroe v. United States, 424 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1970).
156. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1191-92 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (Robb, J., dissenting).
157. The Court has not taken an Allen charge case since 1941, when
it affirmed in Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1951). Even
there, the Court, speaking through Douglas, J., concerned itself with
other matters and referred to the Allen issue, discussed fully in the
circuit court's opinion, only indirectly: "Other alleged errors are
pressed upon us. But they are either insubstantial or else so adequately
disposed of by the Court of Appeals that we give them no notice." Id.
at 744. See note 21 supra for some examples of cases where the Su-
preme Court has denied certiorari.
158. United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407
(3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom. Panaccione v. United States,
396 U.S. 837 (1969).
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IV. ABOLISHING OR LIMITING CHARGES
URGING AGREEMENT
Although the ABA charge appears to be an improvement
over the Allen charge the question still arises whether any
supplemental instruction urging agreement should be permit-
ted. At least one commentator has suggested that in criminal
cases judges should not be allowed to urge agreement and that
if the jury, after reasonable deliberation, indicates they cannot
agree, they should be dismissed. 159 Although this removes the
danger that the judge will infringe upon the right of the de-
fendant to an impartial consideration of his case, there are sev-
eral reasons why the suggestion has not been well received. 8 0
First, federal trial judges have the power to demand a rea-
soned attempt at deliberation before the jury is released.'8 ' A
supplemental instruction urging agreement is an appropriate
method of exercising this power. Fiery emotions may be calmed
during a short time outside the juryroom in the dignified at-
mosphere of the courtroom. Calm words from the bench may
also help. The charge urging agreement puts the prestige of the
court behind further deliberation. In some cases a lecture on
citizenship may be exactly what is needed.
Second, the court has a responsibility to assist the jury in
reaching agreement. 62 Before he releases the jury the judge
must ensure that disagreement is not based on confusion as to
the facts or law, or on irrational emotional considerations. 10 3
In conjunction with this duty the court has the power to in-
quire into the nature of the division to some extent.104 In so
159. Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung Jury: A
Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L Rsv. 123, 147-48 (1967).
160. All circuit courts retain some supplemental charge. Most still
allow the Allen charge (see cases cited in note 16 supra) while a
minority do not allow it but do allow the ABA charge (see text ac-
companying notes 35-51 supra).
161. United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1342 (4th Cir. 1970);
ABA PROJEcT, supra note 29, at 147. Cf. Annot, 93 A.L.R.2d 627,
636-69 (1964).
162. United States v. Johnson, 432 F.2d 626, 630-31 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
163. There is always the danger that strong personality clashes be-
tween individual jurors will improperly affect the deliberation. There
is also the danger that some jurors may be too proud to retract when
they have committed themselves openly to a certain position even after
they realize their position is not correct. Jurors may begin to feel
they have a proprietary interest in what they have been arguing and
thus refuse to change.
164. Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1962)
(Wisdom, J., dissenting). The ABA recommends that the court question
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doing it may find that a disagreement is based on an irrational
personality clash among jurors. For example, in Kawakita v.
United States'65 the foreman and several of the jurors told the
judge in open court that there was a serious personality con-
flict and that the "animosity" which had crept into their delib-
erations would preclude any possibility of reaching a verdict.1 0
Had the Kawakita court dismissed the jury on this basis it
would have been disregarding its duty. Instead the court gave
a supplemental instruction and the jury was able to reach agree-
ment.
Third, there are many practical reasons why trial judges
should use their powers to avoid mistrials. In the first place,
the defendant is not fully protected by a mistrial because the
prosecution may try the case again if the trial is serious or
somewhat sensational. 1 67 And in many cases the evidence may
be of a type which could never again be presented so well.1 08
individual jurors to determine if there is any reasonable probability of
agreement. ABA PROJECT, supra note 29, at 157. The court cannot in-
quire as to the numerical division of the jury. This is viewed as too
explicit a pressure on the minority. Brasfield v. United States, 272
U.S. 448 (1926); cf. Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283 (1905). These
decisions were criticized in Comment, Defusing the Dynamite Charge:
A Critique of Allen and Its Progeny, 36 TENN. L. Rsv. 749, 759 (1969).
It has even been held reversible error to inquire if there is a
"pronounced majority." United States v. Samuel Dunkel & Co., 173
F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1949); Nigro v. United States, 4 F.2d 781 (8th Cir.
1925). It has also been held that even if the jury's division is revealed
inadvertently by the jurors without judicial inquiry there must be a
reversal. People v. Baumgartner, 166 Cal. App. 103, 332 P.2d 366
(1958). On the other hand, most courts hold that if the division is
inadvertently revealed by the jury this does not preclude the issuance
of an otherwise proper supplemental charge urging agreement. United
States v. Williams, 444 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Rao,
394 F.2d 354, 356 (2d Cir. 1968); Bowen v. United States, 153 F.2d 747,
751-52 (8th Cir. 1946). The reasoning is that the judge's knowledge of
the division is irrelevant even if the jury knows he knows of their
division. It is only relevant as to the motivation of the judge in giving
the charge. United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1340 (4th Cir.
1970).
165. 190 F.2d 506 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 343 U.S. 717 (1951).
166. Kawakita v. United States, 190 F.2d 506, 521 & n.17 (9th Cir.),
aff'd, 343 U.S. 717 (1951).
167. But cf. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971), in which the
Court severely restricted the government's power to retry a criminal case
which ended in a mistrial after a jury was impanelled. The Court held
that if the defendant did not cause the mistrial double jeopardy would
usually prevent a second trial. But the Court seemed to except hung
juries from the broad sweep of the rule. Id. at 480-81, 484, 486. See
also 400 U.S. at 489 (dissenting opinion).
168. Shea v. United States, 260 F. 807 (9th Cir. 1919); Suslak v.
United States, 213 F. 913 (9th Cir. 1914).
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Furthermore, refusal to give any supplemental charge urging
agreement could have serious consequences for our criminal
court system. Presently only five per cent of criminal juries
deadlock.169 This is probably due in part to the use of sup-
plemental charges urging agreement. Since court congestion
is a more serious problem now than ever,"70 the possibility of an
increase in mistrials must be considered as a factor which sup-
ports the giving of some type of supplemental charge.' Also,
the expense to the defendant and the government in terms of
time, effort and money are all too great to allow trial courts
simply to ignore the problem.
Finally, the theory that juries should be dismissed when-
ever they indicate disagreement assumes that juries always will
interpret a properly worded plea for agreement as a demand
for a verdict by the court-in other words, that the jury hears
one thing and interprets it differently from the plain meaning
of the words. Yet the evidence that is available indicates that
the jury is not always so unsophisticated. Research indicates
that juries generally make their decisions according to the evi-
dence172 and that they may rebel against rules announced by
the court if they disagree with them.17 3 More important, com-
ments by the judge usually will influence the jury only if
adequately supported by the evidence. 174 It seems clear that it
is not correct to deny the court the opportunity to aid the jury
in reaching agreement simply because the jury may misinter-
pret any suggestions to that effect by the court.' 5
Another restriction on charges urging agreement also has
169. H. KALVEN & H. ZEisEL, THE AaERICAN JURY 453 et seq. (1966).
170. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATEs, ANNUAL REorR
OF THE DEIEcToR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 3, 92-107, 144-68 (1970).171. It is one thing to argue that a milder supplemental instruction
will not seriously increase the number of hung juries and quite an-
other to say there will be no increase if all supplemental charges are
barred. See note 91 supra and accompanying text. If it became com-
mon knowledge among potential jurors that they could avoid what
might be an unpleasant duty, and perhaps pass it on to another jury,
simply by refusing to agree, it is difficult to say that many would
not do so.
172. H. KALVEN & L ZEisEL, supra note 169, at 149-69. The Su-
preme Court noted this research approvingly in Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968).
173. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 169, at 375 et seq.
174. Id. at 427.
175. United States v. Rosso, 58 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1932) (Augus-
tus Hand, J.); ABA PRoJECT, supra note 29, at 157; Icenogle, The Menace
of the Hung Jury, 47 A.B.A.J. 280 (1961).
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been suggested. Most jurisdictions allow such instructions to
be given in the initial charge"' 6 and it has been suggested often
that they be restricted to that charge.1'" This suggestion is
gaining support on the theory that such a practice will minimize
the chance of jury coercion because it does not interrupt deliber-
ation and thus will not be interpreted by the jury as a state-
ment directed to that jury's particular predicament. The basic
information that agreement is highly desirable but should not
be attained at the sacrifice of conscientiously held beliefs is con-
veyed in a way least likely to be interpreted as an order from
the court to reach a verdict."8s On the other hand, it can be
argued that until there is some indication of disagreement this
information is superfluous, and can only be misinterpreted by
the jury.'7 9
When the advice to agree is given in the original charge
there is also a distinct chance that jurors may not consider it
worth remembering inasmuch as they are also being asked to
remember many complex legal instructions. Jurors may throw
off this type of high-sounding and nontechnical advice as no
more than a polite admonition to do their duty. Most impor-
tant, even if all initial instructions contained statements urging
agreement, the question of what a trial judge should do when
confronted by a jury that appears in danger of deadlocking in
spite of the original charge would still occur. Thus the argu-
ment that instructions to agree should be given only in the
initial charge does little more than ignore the problem.
V. CONCLUSION
It would not be wise either to abolish supplemental char-
ges urging agreement or to retain the Allen charge. It may
well be true that the Allen charge suffers unfairly as a result
of improper variations in the language of the instruction, but
this propensity for misuse is all the more reason why a new ap-
176. See, e.g., United States v. Mailey, 440 F.2d 281, 286 & n.27
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431, 434 (10th
Cir. 1966); Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
rev'd on other grounds, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); State v. Parker, 79
Wash. 2d 326, 485 P.2d 60, 64-65 (1971).
177. Janko v. United States, 281 F.2d 156, 167-68 (8th Cir. 1960),
rev'd on other grounds, 366 U.S. 716 (1961); Nick v. United States,
122 F.2d 660, 674 (8th Cir. 1941).
178. Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
179. Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1962);
Fletcher v. State, 8 Md. App. 153, 158, 258 A.2d 781, 783-84 (1969).
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proach should be tried. In any case, the Allen charge's potential
evils clearly seem to outweigh its benefits. Most of the valid
reasons for allowing the Allen charge apply to a milder, more
balanced supplemental instruction which does not involve so
great a risk of coercing the minority.
The ABA charge is probably an improvement on the Allen
charge because it emphasizes the retention of conscientiously
held convictions while telling all jurors, rather than simply the
minority, to reexamine their reasoning. However, the differ-
ence is not so substantial that a less rigorous review standard
should be applied. An ABA charge should be scrupulously re-
viewed on the basis of all the circumstances to determine
whether the charge may have been coercive. In addition, the
circuit courts should demand that trial courts issue all five ele-
ments of the instruction. However, the ABA charge should
serve as a minimum, not a maximum, since to limit trial courts
wholly to this language would preclude them from dealing
with particular jury problems as they discover them. To fur-
ther aid a deadlocked jury there should be a complete rein-
struction on the reasonable doubt standard accompanying the
ABA charge in order to better insure that the supplemental in-
struction will not distort the jury's conception of this difficult
standard.
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